Origins
Since
its inception in the late 1980s, the Sinaloa Federation, the most dominant drug
trafficking organization (DTO) in Mexico, violently competed with rival DTOs in
order to attain supremacy over Mexico’s drug trafficking market.[1]
Its leaders formed their own organization, along with the Juarez and Tijuana
DTOs, in response to the dissolution of the powerful Guadalajara DTO.[2]
Prior to its collapse, the Guadalajara DTO was one of the most powerful DTOs
with links to Sinaloa.[3]
This DTO established the transcontinental smuggling roots for cocaine that are
still present today, but the Guadalajara DTO quickly dissolved after Felix
Gallardo’s arrest in 1989.[4]
Through its fragmentation, it gave rise to the Sinaloa Federation, the Juarez
Cartel and the Tijuana Cartel.[5]
A fight immediately ensued between these former partners to secure the preeminence
previously enjoyed by Felix Gallardo.[6]
Under the ambitious leadership of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the Sinaloa
Federation mobilized its forces to control the border towns along the US
frontier, precipitating intermittent bloody conflicts and shifting alliances
with the aforementioned DTOs as well as with the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas—the
latter presently being their main national rival.[7]
Although all of these organizations have been fractured from turf wars and
aggressive law enforcement tactics, the Sinaloa Federation has emerged as the
most powerful DTO in Mexico.[8]
At present, the Sinaloa Federation’s territorial sway includes 17 Mexican
states, and its distributional territory includes up to 50 countries and myriad
cities in the United States.[9]
It will likely remain the dominant DTO in Mexico due to its structural and
strategic flexibility, its cooptation of police, military and state officials through
bribery, and its reputation—or brand—as a more practical and comparatively less
brutal criminal organization vis-à-vis the Zetas. Currently, all this impels
the government to more overtly combat the Zetas while granting a relative
degree of toleration to the Sinaloa Federation.
Structure
When
the Guadalajara DTO disintegrated, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, Ismael “El Mayo”
Zambada, Juan Jose “El Azul” Esparragoza Moreno and the Beltran Leyva brothers
coalesced to form the core leadership of the Sinaloa Federation.[10]
Unlike the Guadalajara DTO, which was highly centralized under the leadership
of Felix Gallardo, the Sinaloa Federation is not a hierarchical DTO.[11]
It is an assortment of quasi-independent organizations loosely bound together
through kinship, matrimony and provincial affiliation.[12]
The power structure at the top is set up like a “board of directors.”[13]
Cohesion between the bosses is strong, yet power is distributed among them
horizontally.[14] Although
the top leaders cooperate under a single umbrella, they manage their own
distinct organizations, possess their own production and supply networks and
subcontract much of the smuggling to regional associates.[15]
In Mexico, the Sinaloa DTO possibly employs up to 100,000 associates, but the
bosses hardly correspond openly with these subordinates.[16]
Instead, they tend to delegate a broad spectrum of goals and commands to the “plaza
chiefs,” who independently administer their own disparate smuggling regions as
if they were independent “franchises.”[17]
These plaza chiefs, in turn, subcontract smuggling and wholesaling responsibilities
to local subsidiaries in Mexico and abroad.[18]
Main
Activities
The
organization’s main activities include drug production, drug smuggling, money
laundering, and the corruption of public officials through bribery, coercion
and violence. The organization focuses chiefly on its profitable sectors—drug
production and international drug trafficking.[19]
The Sinaloa DTO not only distributes the overwhelming majority of South
American cocaine and Asian heroin that enters the US market, but it also
produces and distributes its own drugs—mainly marijuana, heroin, and
methamphetamines.[20] The
contraband is smuggled into the US primarily through Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez,
and it is the latter that provides highway access to the cartel’s most
important transcontinental distribution hub: Chicago.[21]
Cash used to purchase these drugs are subsequently smuggled back into Mexico.[22]
Consequently, the organization constantly seeks more sophisticated ways to surreptitiously
launder and ensconce their profits into the global financial system.[23]
Despite its preference to curtail law enforcement, attain impunity and foster
transactional efficiency through bribery and corruption, it will not hesitate
to employ lethal force against any uncooperative individual or entity that
prevents it from accomplishing its goals.[24]
Finally, it also employs violence to snuff out national competitors like the
Zetas and to assert control over its crucial transportation routes or plazas.[25]
Strengths
and Weaknesses
The Sinaloa
Federation’s primary strength is its structural durability and flexibility. The
disaggregation of production facilities, supply chains, distribution networks
and wholesalers mean that a major arrest or seizure will have very limited
impact on the organization’s operation overall.[26]
This decentralization has also allowed it to acclimate to the cutthroat and
volatile atmosphere that it currently faces.[27]
Moreover, this decentralized system also shields the bosses from law
enforcement detection since they have little direct contact with subordinates.[28]
At the top of the structure, its leaders share family ties, regional affiliations
and a common history.[29]
While this familial bond may not completely erase the possibility of a
succession battle during an interregnum, no violence erupted in 2014 as a
result of the arrest of El Chapo on the one hand or the death of El Azul on the
other.[30]
On the contrary, business abounds, which seems to indicate that the
organization is flexible in transferring power at the top.[31]
More importantly, however, if there were a succession conflict, it is unlikely
that it would spread to the entire Federation because most of its subordinates
are mere independent subcontractors who are bound to the federation more
through economic cooperation rather than political obedience.[32]
Indeed, its decentralization makes it easier to forge working alliances even
with former rivals such as the Tijuana, Juarez and Gulf Cartels who still
retain their independence.[33]
Conversely, the main drawback of its decentralized system is the difficultly in
preventing organizational secession and rebellion, which is precisely what the
Juarez and Beltran Leyva DTOs did in 2008.[34]
Finally, the
Sinaloa Federation has a more compelling “brand name” vis-à-vis its barbaric
national competitor, the Zetas, whose shocking brutality and predatory criminal
activities—human trafficking, protection rackets, extortion and kidnapping—are
more detested by the Mexican people and the governments of Mexico and the
United States.[35] Indeed, Sinaloa
Federation propaganda aims to distance itself from its Zeta counterparts. El
Chapo professes, “we want citizens to live in peace…without extortion and
kidnapping. We are narcotraffickers and we don’t mess with honest, hardworking
people or local businesses.”[36]
The Sinaloans have shrewdly exploited this perception to win the Mexican
government’s preference.[37]
They have also used informants to manipulate Mexican and U.S. law enforcement
to focus more intently on its more violent prone adversaries, which aggregate arrest
data clearly corroborates.[38]
Conclusion
The Sinaloa
Federation’s structural and operational malleability, its shrewd manipulation
of strategic alliances, its capacity to corrupt public officials and its brand
power have allowed it to propose a more compelling modus vivendi with the Mexican federal government vis-à-vis its
rival cartels. This explains why they have outflanked their rivals and asserted
their dominance over Mexico’s drug trade and why they will continue to be a
formidable challenge to law enforcement in the foreseeable future.
Bibliography
Beith Malcolm, “Current state of mexico’s many drug
cartels” Insight crime. 25 September 2013. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-current-state-of-mexicos-many-drug-cartels
Beittel, June S, “Mexico’s Drug Trafficking
Organizations: Source and Scope of Violence” Congressional Research Service. 15
April 2013, pgs 1-46.
Bender, Jeremy “Nearly Eight Years into the Drug War,
these are Mexico’s 7 Most Notorious Cartels,” Business Insider. 20 October
2014. http://www.businessinsider.com/mexicos-7-most-notorious-drug-cartels-2014-10#ixzz3TAwIGNgp
Burnett John. “Awash in Cash, Drug Cartels Rely on Big Banks
to Launder Profits,” NPR. 20 March 2014.
http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/03/20/291934724/awash-in-cash-drug-cartels-rely-on-big-banks-to-launder-profits
Dudley, Steven and David Martinez-Amador. “Sinaloa
Cartel Succession in Mexico: More Political Intrigue than Violence,” Insight
Crime. 27 February 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/sinaloa-cartel-succession-in-mexico-more-political-intrigue-than-violence
Estevez, Dolia, “FBI Informant Met Drug Lord El Chapo
Guzman in Mexican Mountains,” Forbes. 16 October 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2014/10/16/fbi-informant-met-drug-lord-el-chapo-guzman-in-mexican-mountains/
Gomora, Doris, “La Guerra Secreta de la DEA en
Mexico,” El Universal. 06 January 2014. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2014/impreso/la-guerra-secreta-de-la-dea-en-mexico-212050.html
Gurney, Kyra. “Sinaloa Cartel Leader ‘El Azul’ Dead?
‘El Mayo’ Now in Control?” Insight Crime. 09 June 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/sinaloa-cartel-leader-el-azul-dead-leaving-el-mayo-in-control
Inzunza, Alejandra and Jose Luis Pardo “Cartel de
Sinaloa domina en Nueva York,” El Universal. 24 November 2014. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2014/cartel-de-sinaloa-domina-en-nueva-york-1056571.html
Johnson, Tim. “Do U.S., Mexican Officials Favor One
Cartel Over Another?” Miami Herald, 24 August 2011. Accessed at: http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/do-u-s-mexican-officials-favor-one-cartel-over-another/
Keefe, Patrick Radden, “Cocaine Incorporated” The New
York Times Magazine. 15 June 2012.
Keefe, Patrick Radden, “The Hunt for El Chapo,” The
New Yorker. 5 May 2014.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/05/the-hunt-for-el-chapo
Lewis, Dean, “Why are the Sinaloa Cartel the World’s
Most Powerful Gangsters?” International Business Times. 16 September 2014. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/why-are-sinaloa-cartel-worlds-most-powerful-gangsters-1465574
Logan, Samuel “The Sinaloa Federation’s International
Presence,” CTC Sentinel. 29 April 2013
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-sinaloa-federations-international-presence
McGahan, Jason. “Why Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel Love
Selling Drugs in Chicago,” Chicago Magazine. 17 September 2013. http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/October-2013/Sinaloa-Cartel/index.php?cparticle=2&siarticle=1#artanc
Roston, Aram. “El Chapo Guzman, Mexico’s Most Powerful
Drug Lord,” Newsweek. 30 January 2012. http://www.newsweek.com/el-chapo-guzman-mexicos-most-powerful-drug-lord-64321
“Sinaloa Cartel,” Insight Crime. http://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile
“The Cleansing by El Chapo” Borderland Beat. 18 April
2012 http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/04/cleansing-by-el-chapo-in-zeta-turf.html
“The Felix Gallardo Organization (Guadalajara OCG),”
Wilson Center. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/the-felix-gallardo-organization-guadalajara-ocg
Tuckman, Jo “Life After El Chapo: a Year on from Drug
Kingpin’s Capture, Business is Blooming,” The Guardian. 20 February 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/20/mexico-drugs-trade-el-chapo-arrest-joaquin-guzman-sinaloa-cartel
Valdez, Diana Washington, “Sinaloa Drug Cartel Can
Continue Without ‘Chapo’ Guzman, Experts Say” El Paso Times. 02 March 2014. http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_25257894/sinaloa-drug-cartel-can-continue-without-chapo-guzman
Wood, Paul, “Inside Mexico’s Feared Sinaloa Drugs Cartel,”
BBC News Magazine. 15 May 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27427123
No comments:
Post a Comment