Cuban Power Projection and Interventionism in Africa During the Cold War

Introduction

  Since the 1960s, the Cuban government extended their support for liberation movements in the African Continent. In particular, the Cubans developed a special rapport with the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and from 1975 to 1988 the Cubans made their largest contribution and sacrifice in defending the MPLA in its civil war against its rival political factions. After securing MPLA rule from utter destruction against a coalition of internal and external enemies, thousands of Cuban volunteers flooded Angola to rebuild Angola. Cuban military advisors also trained the MPLA’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and prepared them for decisive battle with the South African Defense Forces (SADF) in Cuito Cuanavale. In employing their bold foreign policy, the Cubans defied the wishes of both the Soviet Union and the United States. However, they answered the wishes of millions of oppressed black Africans in Southern Africa. After their victory over the SADF in Cuito Cuanavale, South African rewarded Namibia its independence and apartheid rule in South Africa crumbled shortly thereafter. Cuban intervention in Angola not only secured the MPLA from its various enemies, but, more importantly, it paved the way for the liberation of Southern Africa from white domination.

Cuban-MPLA Relations: Origins

In its ideological commitment to support national liberation struggles against colonialism and Western hegemony, the Cuban government dispatched military advisors and assistance throughout the Continent of Africa. It supported liberation struggles in Algeria, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. Cubans began to establish relations with the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the early 1960s. In 1962, six MPLA lieutenants sojourned to Cuba for military training, and in 1965 Captain Rafael Moracén Limonta and nine advisors arrived to a MPLA training camp in the Congo. During his deployment, Moracén accompanied MPLA troops in battles against the Portuguese where he established an enduring friendship with Agostinho Neto in Congo. Between 1965 and 1974, Cuba provided military aid to rebel factions in Angola and Mozambique—two Portuguese colonies in Africa striving to assert their independence from their European rulers. Over this time, the Cubans developed particularly strong relations with the MPLA. 

Angolan Independence and Operation Carlota

After a coup d’état in Portugal in 1974, the new Portuguese regime finally announced their intention to end hostilities and awarded independence to their colonies. However, as the Portuguese pulled out, the three rival factions—the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA—waged a bitter contest over Luanda. Each of these rivals obtained foreign support in their bid for power. The Cubans maintained their support for the MPLA. The South Africans reached an agreement with UNITA who promised to respect South African sovereignty. They would provide training and covert military support to UNITA rebels. Zaire and China sponsored the FNLA while the US pragmatically backed both non-Communist UNITA and FNLA factions. Because the MPLA bitterly opposed apartheid and would provide a sanctuary for ANC guerrillas and Namibian insurgents, the South African government aimed to destroy the MPLA.

As the fighting between the three factions intensified in 1975, the MPLA tenuously held onto power. The MPLA faced imminent danger. They were outflanked from the north by the Zaire supported FNLA and from the South African backed UNITA in the south. Meanwhile the Soviets—worried that overtly aggressive actions in Angola would undermine détente with the US—were hesitant to intervene directly. Left with little options, Neto desperately pled to Cuba for immediate support. Castro sent around 500 military advisors to prepare the MPLA forces for combat. Fearful that Cuban intervention could balance the power in the MPLA’s favor and create an antagonistic neighbor, the South Africans deployed their special forces toward Luanda in October. Insurgents from Zaire moved to appropriate Angola’s oil wells in Cabinda—its principal economic resource. Fortunately, Neto’s request was swiftly answered: on November 4^th, Fidel Castro announced Operation Carlota whereby Cuba dispatched airplanes carrying a battalion of special forces and artillery to bolster the MPLA forces. They also sent out naval vessels loaded with firearms and several thousand combat troops. With the aid of the Cubans, the MPLA made swift gains against their opponents. The MPLA pushed their enemies beyond the limits of Luanda, leaving the capital firmly in the grasp of the MPLA. The Cubans defeated the rebels in Cabinda and placed the oil wells under the MPLA’s authority. Finally, the Cuban troops halted the South African drive toward Luanda at the Queve River. In all, the Cuban intervention rescued the MPLA, destroyed the FNLA and impelled the South Africans to retreat from Angola. 

After the Cubans helped the MPLA push back their enemies and secure their power, they began to focus their energy on nation building projects. When the Portuguese abandoned Angola, most of the white settlers fled back to Portugal. Angola lost 350,000 Portuguese colonists—most of its educated and technical workforce. In order to offset this destabilizing brain drain, the Cuban government inundated Angola with teachers, medical professionals, construction workers and technicians. Over the course of a dozen years, Cuba sent up to 430,000 such foreign volunteers and humanitarian aid workers to Angola to reinforce nation building efforts. Prior to the Cuban intervention, only four medical schools existed in Angola. Within a few years, Cuban aid workers helped establish seventeen more medical schools throughout the country. Meanwhile, the Cuban government invited thousands of Angolans to study in Cuba at no cost. The Cubans did not merely intend to defend Angola; it also intended to rebuild Angola as well.

Cuban Intervention in Angola: Political Consequences

In supporting liberation movements and Marxist groups in Africa, the Americans believed that the Cubans were merely a proxy force of the Soviet Union. However, in reality, the Cubans acted unilaterally. When they instituted interventionist foreign policy, they often presented their moves to the Soviets as faits accomplis. At times, they pulled their circumspect superpower ally into geopolitically controversial situations it sought to avoid while they were capitalizing from détente with the United States. They even outright defied the Soviet Union’s interference in Angolan politics. When the Soviet’s engineered a coup to replace Neto with a leader they preferred, the Cubans defended Neto and squashed the Soviet backed coup. While the Cubans did receive massive support from the Soviets throughout the 70s and 80s, this support did not convert the Cubans into mere puppets of the Soviets. 

  In upholding their revolutionary ideals, the Cubans also sacrificed the possibility of rapprochement with the United States. The Carter administration was prepared to establish the groundwork for normalizing relations. However, the Carter administration’s offer was contingent upon Cuba abandoning its revolutionary activity in Africa. Castro refused to budge. The Cuban government sacrificed the possibility of normal relations with the United States because they had an obligation to defend their ally. Castro claimed he was invited by the MPLA and that he could not unilaterally withdraw from Angola without the consent of the MPLA. As a result, the promising mood elicited by earlier diplomatic discussions between Washington and Havana came to an immediate halt. For Castro, the broader moral obligation of liberating Angola and challenging the Apartheid regime outweighed the narrow goals of national self-interest. This challenge reached its apex during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

In response to the FAPLA’s endeavor to eliminate UNITA in southern Angola, the South African Defense Forces coalesced with the UNITA rebels to launch a decisive assault against the FAPLA. The ensuing Battle of Cuito Cuanavale turned out to be the largest conventional battle in Africa since World War Two. In response to the offensive, the Cubans deployed 50,000 troops. In the following five months, the Cubans repulsed four South African offensives. Both sides fought ferociously, but Cuba gained the strategic edge: the Cuban Air Force had attained air superiority. The South Africans were forced to retreat, and the Cubans claimed victory over Africa’s most dominant military force. 

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale culminated in enormous changes for Southern Africa. The victory secured Angola’s southern frontier, cemented the political ascendency of the MPLA and led to the independence of Namibia. More significantly, for black Southern Africans, it destroyed the myth of the South African Defense Forces “invincibility,” which presaged the termination of apartheid rule in South Africa. In fact, Nelson Mandela referred to the battle’s outcome as “a turning point for the liberation of our continent and my people.” Within three years of the battle, Cuban troops withdrew from Angola and Nelson Mandela finally won his freedom. Upon his release, Mandela flew to Havana to extend his gratitude to Fidel Castro for the Cuban people's role in liberating Southern Africa from the clutches of white domination. 

Conclusion

  Shortly after its inception, Cuba’s revolutionary government aimed to support liberation movements around the world. It spent dozens of years establishing relations with various revolutionary groups in Africa, but its most significant alliance was formed with the MPLA. In its unwavering support for the MPLA, the Cubans challenged the United States and their Soviet ally. From 1975 to 1988, the Cubans repulsed the enemies of the MPLA from Angolan territory. The Cuban contribution reached its zenith toward the end of 1987 during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. In this ongoing struggle, the Cuban people made enormous sacrifices. However, in their sacrifices, they destroyed the myth of white supremacy and proliferated the joy of freedom to the oppressed people of Southern Africa.

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