The Status of The Sinaloa Federation in 2015

Origins

            Since its inception in the late 1980s, the Sinaloa Federation, the most dominant drug trafficking organization (DTO) in Mexico, violently competed with rival DTOs in order to attain supremacy over Mexico’s drug trafficking market.[1] Its leaders formed their own organization, along with the Juarez and Tijuana DTOs, in response to the dissolution of the powerful Guadalajara DTO.[2] Prior to its collapse, the Guadalajara DTO was one of the most powerful DTOs with links to Sinaloa.[3] This DTO established the transcontinental smuggling roots for cocaine that are still present today, but the Guadalajara DTO quickly dissolved after Felix Gallardo’s arrest in 1989.[4] Through its fragmentation, it gave rise to the Sinaloa Federation, the Juarez Cartel and the Tijuana Cartel.[5] A fight immediately ensued between these former partners to secure the preeminence previously enjoyed by Felix Gallardo.[6] Under the ambitious leadership of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the Sinaloa Federation mobilized its forces to control the border towns along the US frontier, precipitating intermittent bloody conflicts and shifting alliances with the aforementioned DTOs as well as with the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas—the latter presently being their main national rival.[7] Although all of these organizations have been fractured from turf wars and aggressive law enforcement tactics, the Sinaloa Federation has emerged as the most powerful DTO in Mexico.[8] At present, the Sinaloa Federation’s territorial sway includes 17 Mexican states, and its distributional territory includes up to 50 countries and myriad cities in the United States.[9] It will likely remain the dominant DTO in Mexico due to its structural and strategic flexibility, its cooptation of police, military and state officials through bribery, and its reputation—or brand—as a more practical and comparatively less brutal criminal organization vis-à-vis the Zetas. Currently, all this impels the government to more overtly combat the Zetas while granting a relative degree of toleration to the Sinaloa Federation.

Structure

        When the Guadalajara DTO disintegrated, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, Juan Jose “El Azul” Esparragoza Moreno and the Beltran Leyva brothers coalesced to form the core leadership of the Sinaloa Federation.[10] Unlike the Guadalajara DTO, which was highly centralized under the leadership of Felix Gallardo, the Sinaloa Federation is not a hierarchical DTO.[11] It is an assortment of quasi-independent organizations loosely bound together through kinship, matrimony and provincial affiliation.[12] The power structure at the top is set up like a “board of directors.”[13] Cohesion between the bosses is strong, yet power is distributed among them horizontally.[14] Although the top leaders cooperate under a single umbrella, they manage their own distinct organizations, possess their own production and supply networks and subcontract much of the smuggling to regional associates.[15] In Mexico, the Sinaloa DTO possibly employs up to 100,000 associates, but the bosses hardly correspond openly with these subordinates.[16] Instead, they tend to delegate a broad spectrum of goals and commands to the “plaza chiefs,” who independently administer their own disparate smuggling regions as if they were independent “franchises.”[17] These plaza chiefs, in turn, subcontract smuggling and wholesaling responsibilities to local subsidiaries in Mexico and abroad.[18] 

Main Activities

The organization’s main activities include drug production, drug smuggling, money laundering, and the corruption of public officials through bribery, coercion and violence. The organization focuses chiefly on its profitable sectors—drug production and international drug trafficking.[19] The Sinaloa DTO not only distributes the overwhelming majority of South American cocaine and Asian heroin that enters the US market, but it also produces and distributes its own drugs—mainly marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamines.[20] The contraband is smuggled into the US primarily through Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez, and it is the latter that provides highway access to the cartel’s most important transcontinental distribution hub: Chicago.[21] Cash used to purchase these drugs are subsequently smuggled back into Mexico.[22] Consequently, the organization constantly seeks more sophisticated ways to surreptitiously launder and ensconce their profits into the global financial system.[23] Despite its preference to curtail law enforcement, attain impunity and foster transactional efficiency through bribery and corruption, it will not hesitate to employ lethal force against any uncooperative individual or entity that prevents it from accomplishing its goals.[24] Finally, it also employs violence to snuff out national competitors like the Zetas and to assert control over its crucial transportation routes or plazas.[25]

Strengths and Weaknesses

The Sinaloa Federation’s primary strength is its structural durability and flexibility. The disaggregation of production facilities, supply chains, distribution networks and wholesalers mean that a major arrest or seizure will have very limited impact on the organization’s operation overall.[26] This decentralization has also allowed it to acclimate to the cutthroat and volatile atmosphere that it currently faces.[27] Moreover, this decentralized system also shields the bosses from law enforcement detection since they have little direct contact with subordinates.[28] At the top of the structure, its leaders share family ties, regional affiliations and a common history.[29] While this familial bond may not completely erase the possibility of a succession battle during an interregnum, no violence erupted in 2014 as a result of the arrest of El Chapo on the one hand or the death of El Azul on the other.[30] On the contrary, business abounds, which seems to indicate that the organization is flexible in transferring power at the top.[31] More importantly, however, if there were a succession conflict, it is unlikely that it would spread to the entire Federation because most of its subordinates are mere independent subcontractors who are bound to the federation more through economic cooperation rather than political obedience.[32] Indeed, its decentralization makes it easier to forge working alliances even with former rivals such as the Tijuana, Juarez and Gulf Cartels who still retain their independence.[33] Conversely, the main drawback of its decentralized system is the difficultly in preventing organizational secession and rebellion, which is precisely what the Juarez and Beltran Leyva DTOs did in 2008.[34]

Finally, the Sinaloa Federation has a more compelling “brand name” vis-à-vis its barbaric national competitor, the Zetas, whose shocking brutality and predatory criminal activities—human trafficking, protection rackets, extortion and kidnapping—are more detested by the Mexican people and the governments of Mexico and the United States.[35] Indeed, Sinaloa Federation propaganda aims to distance itself from its Zeta counterparts. El Chapo professes, “we want citizens to live in peace…without extortion and kidnapping. We are narcotraffickers and we don’t mess with honest, hardworking people or local businesses.”[36] The Sinaloans have shrewdly exploited this perception to win the Mexican government’s preference.[37] They have also used informants to manipulate Mexican and U.S. law enforcement to focus more intently on its more violent prone adversaries, which aggregate arrest data clearly corroborates.[38]

Conclusion

The Sinaloa Federation’s structural and operational malleability, its shrewd manipulation of strategic alliances, its capacity to corrupt public officials and its brand power have allowed it to propose a more compelling modus vivendi with the Mexican federal government vis-à-vis its rival cartels. This explains why they have outflanked their rivals and asserted their dominance over Mexico’s drug trade and why they will continue to be a formidable challenge to law enforcement in the foreseeable future.

                                                          Bibliography

Beith Malcolm, “Current state of mexico’s many drug cartels” Insight crime. 25 September 2013. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-current-state-of-mexicos-many-drug-cartels

Beittel, June S, “Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of Violence” Congressional Research Service. 15 April 2013, pgs 1-46.

Bender, Jeremy “Nearly Eight Years into the Drug War, these are Mexico’s 7 Most Notorious Cartels,” Business Insider. 20 October 2014. http://www.businessinsider.com/mexicos-7-most-notorious-drug-cartels-2014-10#ixzz3TAwIGNgp

Burnett John. “Awash in Cash, Drug Cartels Rely on Big Banks to Launder Profits,” NPR. 20 March 2014.  http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/03/20/291934724/awash-in-cash-drug-cartels-rely-on-big-banks-to-launder-profits

Dudley, Steven and David Martinez-Amador. “Sinaloa Cartel Succession in Mexico: More Political Intrigue than Violence,” Insight Crime. 27 February 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/sinaloa-cartel-succession-in-mexico-more-political-intrigue-than-violence

Estevez, Dolia, “FBI Informant Met Drug Lord El Chapo Guzman in Mexican Mountains,” Forbes. 16 October 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2014/10/16/fbi-informant-met-drug-lord-el-chapo-guzman-in-mexican-mountains/

Gomora, Doris, “La Guerra Secreta de la DEA en Mexico,” El Universal. 06 January 2014. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2014/impreso/la-guerra-secreta-de-la-dea-en-mexico-212050.html

Gurney, Kyra. “Sinaloa Cartel Leader ‘El Azul’ Dead? ‘El Mayo’ Now in Control?” Insight Crime. 09 June 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/sinaloa-cartel-leader-el-azul-dead-leaving-el-mayo-in-control

Inzunza, Alejandra and Jose Luis Pardo “Cartel de Sinaloa domina en Nueva York,” El Universal. 24 November 2014. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2014/cartel-de-sinaloa-domina-en-nueva-york-1056571.html

Johnson, Tim. “Do U.S., Mexican Officials Favor One Cartel Over Another?” Miami Herald, 24 August 2011. Accessed at: http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/do-u-s-mexican-officials-favor-one-cartel-over-another/

Keefe, Patrick Radden, “Cocaine Incorporated” The New York Times Magazine. 15 June 2012.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-billions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2

Keefe, Patrick Radden, “The Hunt for El Chapo,” The New Yorker. 5 May 2014.

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/05/the-hunt-for-el-chapo

Lewis, Dean, “Why are the Sinaloa Cartel the World’s Most Powerful Gangsters?” International Business Times. 16 September 2014. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/why-are-sinaloa-cartel-worlds-most-powerful-gangsters-1465574

Logan, Samuel “The Sinaloa Federation’s International Presence,” CTC Sentinel. 29 April 2013

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-sinaloa-federations-international-presence

McGahan, Jason. “Why Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel Love Selling Drugs in Chicago,” Chicago Magazine. 17 September 2013. http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/October-2013/Sinaloa-Cartel/index.php?cparticle=2&siarticle=1#artanc

Roston, Aram. “El Chapo Guzman, Mexico’s Most Powerful Drug Lord,” Newsweek. 30 January 2012. http://www.newsweek.com/el-chapo-guzman-mexicos-most-powerful-drug-lord-64321

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“The Cleansing by El Chapo” Borderland Beat. 18 April 2012 http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/04/cleansing-by-el-chapo-in-zeta-turf.html

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Tuckman, Jo “Life After El Chapo: a Year on from Drug Kingpin’s Capture, Business is Blooming,” The Guardian. 20 February 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/20/mexico-drugs-trade-el-chapo-arrest-joaquin-guzman-sinaloa-cartel

Valdez, Diana Washington, “Sinaloa Drug Cartel Can Continue Without ‘Chapo’ Guzman, Experts Say” El Paso Times. 02 March 2014. http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_25257894/sinaloa-drug-cartel-can-continue-without-chapo-guzman

Wood, Paul, “Inside Mexico’s Feared Sinaloa Drugs Cartel,” BBC News Magazine. 15 May 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27427123

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Cuban Power Projection and Interventionism in Africa During the Cold War

Introduction

  Since the 1960s, the Cuban government extended their support for liberation movements in the African Continent. In particular, the Cubans developed a special rapport with the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and from 1975 to 1988 the Cubans made their largest contribution and sacrifice in defending the MPLA in its civil war against its rival political factions. After securing MPLA rule from utter destruction against a coalition of internal and external enemies, thousands of Cuban volunteers flooded Angola to rebuild Angola. Cuban military advisors also trained the MPLA’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and prepared them for decisive battle with the South African Defense Forces (SADF) in Cuito Cuanavale. In employing their bold foreign policy, the Cubans defied the wishes of both the Soviet Union and the United States. However, they answered the wishes of millions of oppressed black Africans in Southern Africa. After their victory over the SADF in Cuito Cuanavale, South African rewarded Namibia its independence and apartheid rule in South Africa crumbled shortly thereafter. Cuban intervention in Angola not only secured the MPLA from its various enemies, but, more importantly, it paved the way for the liberation of Southern Africa from white domination.

Cuban-MPLA Relations: Origins

In its ideological commitment to support national liberation struggles against colonialism and Western hegemony, the Cuban government dispatched military advisors and assistance throughout the Continent of Africa. It supported liberation struggles in Algeria, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. Cubans began to establish relations with the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the early 1960s. In 1962, six MPLA lieutenants sojourned to Cuba for military training, and in 1965 Captain Rafael Moracén Limonta and nine advisors arrived to a MPLA training camp in the Congo. During his deployment, Moracén accompanied MPLA troops in battles against the Portuguese where he established an enduring friendship with Agostinho Neto in Congo. Between 1965 and 1974, Cuba provided military aid to rebel factions in Angola and Mozambique—two Portuguese colonies in Africa striving to assert their independence from their European rulers. Over this time, the Cubans developed particularly strong relations with the MPLA. 

Angolan Independence and Operation Carlota

After a coup d’état in Portugal in 1974, the new Portuguese regime finally announced their intention to end hostilities and awarded independence to their colonies. However, as the Portuguese pulled out, the three rival factions—the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA—waged a bitter contest over Luanda. Each of these rivals obtained foreign support in their bid for power. The Cubans maintained their support for the MPLA. The South Africans reached an agreement with UNITA who promised to respect South African sovereignty. They would provide training and covert military support to UNITA rebels. Zaire and China sponsored the FNLA while the US pragmatically backed both non-Communist UNITA and FNLA factions. Because the MPLA bitterly opposed apartheid and would provide a sanctuary for ANC guerrillas and Namibian insurgents, the South African government aimed to destroy the MPLA.

As the fighting between the three factions intensified in 1975, the MPLA tenuously held onto power. The MPLA faced imminent danger. They were outflanked from the north by the Zaire supported FNLA and from the South African backed UNITA in the south. Meanwhile the Soviets—worried that overtly aggressive actions in Angola would undermine détente with the US—were hesitant to intervene directly. Left with little options, Neto desperately pled to Cuba for immediate support. Castro sent around 500 military advisors to prepare the MPLA forces for combat. Fearful that Cuban intervention could balance the power in the MPLA’s favor and create an antagonistic neighbor, the South Africans deployed their special forces toward Luanda in October. Insurgents from Zaire moved to appropriate Angola’s oil wells in Cabinda—its principal economic resource. Fortunately, Neto’s request was swiftly answered: on November 4^th, Fidel Castro announced Operation Carlota whereby Cuba dispatched airplanes carrying a battalion of special forces and artillery to bolster the MPLA forces. They also sent out naval vessels loaded with firearms and several thousand combat troops. With the aid of the Cubans, the MPLA made swift gains against their opponents. The MPLA pushed their enemies beyond the limits of Luanda, leaving the capital firmly in the grasp of the MPLA. The Cubans defeated the rebels in Cabinda and placed the oil wells under the MPLA’s authority. Finally, the Cuban troops halted the South African drive toward Luanda at the Queve River. In all, the Cuban intervention rescued the MPLA, destroyed the FNLA and impelled the South Africans to retreat from Angola. 

After the Cubans helped the MPLA push back their enemies and secure their power, they began to focus their energy on nation building projects. When the Portuguese abandoned Angola, most of the white settlers fled back to Portugal. Angola lost 350,000 Portuguese colonists—most of its educated and technical workforce. In order to offset this destabilizing brain drain, the Cuban government inundated Angola with teachers, medical professionals, construction workers and technicians. Over the course of a dozen years, Cuba sent up to 430,000 such foreign volunteers and humanitarian aid workers to Angola to reinforce nation building efforts. Prior to the Cuban intervention, only four medical schools existed in Angola. Within a few years, Cuban aid workers helped establish seventeen more medical schools throughout the country. Meanwhile, the Cuban government invited thousands of Angolans to study in Cuba at no cost. The Cubans did not merely intend to defend Angola; it also intended to rebuild Angola as well.

Cuban Intervention in Angola: Political Consequences

In supporting liberation movements and Marxist groups in Africa, the Americans believed that the Cubans were merely a proxy force of the Soviet Union. However, in reality, the Cubans acted unilaterally. When they instituted interventionist foreign policy, they often presented their moves to the Soviets as faits accomplis. At times, they pulled their circumspect superpower ally into geopolitically controversial situations it sought to avoid while they were capitalizing from détente with the United States. They even outright defied the Soviet Union’s interference in Angolan politics. When the Soviet’s engineered a coup to replace Neto with a leader they preferred, the Cubans defended Neto and squashed the Soviet backed coup. While the Cubans did receive massive support from the Soviets throughout the 70s and 80s, this support did not convert the Cubans into mere puppets of the Soviets. 

  In upholding their revolutionary ideals, the Cubans also sacrificed the possibility of rapprochement with the United States. The Carter administration was prepared to establish the groundwork for normalizing relations. However, the Carter administration’s offer was contingent upon Cuba abandoning its revolutionary activity in Africa. Castro refused to budge. The Cuban government sacrificed the possibility of normal relations with the United States because they had an obligation to defend their ally. Castro claimed he was invited by the MPLA and that he could not unilaterally withdraw from Angola without the consent of the MPLA. As a result, the promising mood elicited by earlier diplomatic discussions between Washington and Havana came to an immediate halt. For Castro, the broader moral obligation of liberating Angola and challenging the Apartheid regime outweighed the narrow goals of national self-interest. This challenge reached its apex during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

In response to the FAPLA’s endeavor to eliminate UNITA in southern Angola, the South African Defense Forces coalesced with the UNITA rebels to launch a decisive assault against the FAPLA. The ensuing Battle of Cuito Cuanavale turned out to be the largest conventional battle in Africa since World War Two. In response to the offensive, the Cubans deployed 50,000 troops. In the following five months, the Cubans repulsed four South African offensives. Both sides fought ferociously, but Cuba gained the strategic edge: the Cuban Air Force had attained air superiority. The South Africans were forced to retreat, and the Cubans claimed victory over Africa’s most dominant military force. 

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale culminated in enormous changes for Southern Africa. The victory secured Angola’s southern frontier, cemented the political ascendency of the MPLA and led to the independence of Namibia. More significantly, for black Southern Africans, it destroyed the myth of the South African Defense Forces “invincibility,” which presaged the termination of apartheid rule in South Africa. In fact, Nelson Mandela referred to the battle’s outcome as “a turning point for the liberation of our continent and my people.” Within three years of the battle, Cuban troops withdrew from Angola and Nelson Mandela finally won his freedom. Upon his release, Mandela flew to Havana to extend his gratitude to Fidel Castro for the Cuban people's role in liberating Southern Africa from the clutches of white domination. 

Conclusion

  Shortly after its inception, Cuba’s revolutionary government aimed to support liberation movements around the world. It spent dozens of years establishing relations with various revolutionary groups in Africa, but its most significant alliance was formed with the MPLA. In its unwavering support for the MPLA, the Cubans challenged the United States and their Soviet ally. From 1975 to 1988, the Cubans repulsed the enemies of the MPLA from Angolan territory. The Cuban contribution reached its zenith toward the end of 1987 during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. In this ongoing struggle, the Cuban people made enormous sacrifices. However, in their sacrifices, they destroyed the myth of white supremacy and proliferated the joy of freedom to the oppressed people of Southern Africa.

Bibiliography

Cohen Jr., Sylvester. “Cuba and the Liberation of Southern Africa” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine, Vol. 46 Issue 4

Foss, Clive. “Cuba’s African Adventures” History Today 60.3 (2010) 10-16

Gleijeses, Piero. "The Cuban Drumbeat." (2009) New York: Seagull Books.

Gleijeses, Piero. "Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975–1988." Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 2 (2006): 3-51.

Henighan, Stephen. “The Cuban Fulcrum and the Search for a Transatlantic Revolutionary Culture in Angola, Mozambique and Chile, 1965 - 2008” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 7, no. 3 (2009), 233-248

Kasrils, Ronnie. “Turning Point at Cuito Cuanavale” IOL News. 23 March 2008 http://www.iol.co.za/news/world/turning-point-at-cuito-cuanavale-1.393891#.VP_kgYHF-Y0